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ABSTRACT We argue that self-efficacy is important for economic performance. Self-
efficacy is at the psychological core of agency and entrepreneurship. It enables people to 
learn, and change and act to better their livelihood. In an agent-based model we show 
how different levels of individual self-efficacy can evolve as a reaction to environmental 
demands and rewards to human intervention. The basic idea is that people learn how to 
best survive in their specific environment and teach this knowledge to their children. 
Because this cultural heritage only adapts very slowly to the current environment, 
people might have self-efficacy levels that better fit to the context of their ancestors than 
to their own. With empirical data from Ghana, we defind that different-levels of self-
efficacy have developed from different historic environmental conditions and directly 
influence today´s household incomes, controlling for observable incentives and 
constraints. Specifically, the historic returns on agricultural investments are found to 
have shaped the cultural evolution of self-efficacy. In contrast, current returns on 
investment explain far less variation in self-efficacy. We find that this cultural trait 
significantly affects income levels through shaping the farmers’ investment behavior. 
Regarding the measurement of self-efficacy, we find self-efficacy to be a process- rather 
than a goal-oriented belief and it is mainly culturally transmitted.  
Our results identify self-efficacy as important specific target for development policy. 
KEYWORDS Self-Efficacy; Economic Performance; Economic Development, Economic 
History, Cultural Evolution; Smallholder Farming 
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I. Introduction 
Self-efficacy is the belief to have the abilities and capabilities to act according to one´s 
own decisions and to achieve desired goals. Because self-efficacy assures and motivates 
people, it increases their persistence, increases their planning horizon, decreases their 
risk aversion and increases their openness to learning, thereby forming the ground for 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship in turn is a major determinant of a nation´s 
economic development. Self-efficacy develops always and everywhere in interaction with 
the surrounding environment and its evolution is not limited to specific circumstance. 
Only its strength is: the more positively an environment reacts to human intervention 
like granting greater harvests after fertilizing, people will develop greater levels of self-
efficacy. In environments with high disease pressure or low agricultural potential, a 
lower average sense of self-efficacy is the natural outcome. Then, low self-efficacy feeds 
back and makes successful interventions even less likely. The ideal environment to 
develop a high sense of self-efficacy is a challenging one that can be mastered. Many 
environments in the temperate zone fulfil this criterion (you might think of Europe, 
where diseases were mostly weak enough to successfully fight them and where soils and 
climate allowed the development of an intensive agriculture to feed a large and growing 
population), whereas this is less common in the tropics and polar regions. 
The concept of self-efficacy has been first developed by the Canadian psychologist Alfred 
Bandura in the 1970s (Bandura, 1977) and extensively tested in several pedagogic and 
therapeutic settings (Luszczynska, Gutiérrez‐Doña, & Schwarzer, 2005; Pajares, 1997; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). 
Bandura found self-efficacy to be a major human trait controlling and initiating 
individual and group behavior (Bandura, 1990, 1993, 1997; Bandura, Barbaranelli, 
Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Schwarzer, 2014). He further developed the concept to one 
of environmental, behavioral and cognitive interaction where he found self-enforcing 
feedback-loops which he called “triadic reciprocality”: environment influences behavior 
and personal factors influencing environment and each other (Bandura, 1986; Pajares, 
2002). 
Based on Bandura´s conception of reciprocal determinism we suggest that self-efficacy 
is the key factor of individual economic performance, originating from long-term 
environmental stimuli.  
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In psychology and behavioral economics, it has been found that most people use more 
or less crude rules of thumb instead of sophisticated cost benefit calculations in their 
decision making (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 2011; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; 
Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014; Mullainathan, 2005). In evolutionary anthropology is has 
been established that most of these heuristics are hereditary (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 
1995; Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2008; Richerson, Boyd, & 
Henrich, 2010). Based on these two strands of thought we explore how historical 
circumstances shaped the evolution of a specific and economically influential rule of 
thumb so that we can understand why individuals and societies make systematically 
different decisions even when facing the same incentives and constraints (Nunn, 2012).  
Prior research into this direction includes Tabellini (2010), who investigates the effect of 
historically shaped culture at a regional level in Europe. His selection of cultural traits 
is based on prior research by others, especially by the American political scientist 
Edward Banfield (1958) whose visit to Southern Italy inspired his argumentation that 
certain cultural traits cause the farmers in the South of Italy to be poor. He observed 
resignation and perceived helplessness, a focus on the immediate family instead of the 
wider community, and interpersonal distrust. Using an econometric framework to 
control for omitted variables and reverse causality, Tabellini (2010) investigates whether 
these aspects of culture have historic roots and matter for current economic 
development in Europe. He identifies historic institutions as their cause and finds that 
social capital and confidence in the individual go a long way in explaining economic 
differences. Welzel (2013) finds a similar relationship between economic performance 
and natural environment with regard to Northern Europe. One of the contributions of 
such research is that by understanding the historic origin of cultural differences and by 
quantifying their economic impact one might be better able to design more efficient, more 
specifically targeted development policies (see Mullainathan (2005)).  
An important feature of self-efficacy is that it is a “mental model”, independent from the 
actual competence of an individual, her environment and of how realistic her judgement 
is. What is important for setting ambitious goals and reaching them is the belief to have 
all what it takes to reach them. It is this belief that enables people to dare to learn new 
information, try new inventions, set high goals, keep trying for a longer time even when 
problems arise. Having a high degree of self-efficacy means that a person believes she 
has influence on her life, she has the internal locus of control and can move from there 
4 
 
to act. She is able to be persistent in her endeavors, master difficulties and keep on 
trying for a longer time. (Note that while persistence describes the time aspect of self-
efficacy, the often mistaken resilience is not; resilience as the ability to spring-back after 
an external shock and is an independent trait, which may or may not occur in 
conjunction with self-efficacy). Self-efficacy is the core prerequisite of human agency as 
it is this belief that enables people to act as an agent for herself and others. Self-efficacy 
may occur in concert with resilience and entitlement, but while self-efficacy is part of 
the inward-oriented self-construct, entitlement is outward oriented and part of an 
individual´s world-view. Asymmetric occurrence of these three connected traits leads to 
social stress that may adversely affect economic performance: having a sense of 
entitlement without the self-efficacy to earn the rewards one feels entitled to may lead to 
a feeling of deprivation which may lead to adverse or maladapted social behavior and to 
shortcomings in economic activity. Having resilience without self-efficacy may lead to 
suffering through endurance instead of activity to get out of the adverse situation, again 
potentially harming economic performance.  
Every environment continuously requests and rewards reaction of the inhabitants in the 
form of information reconciliation, learning, and behavior adaptation. Thus, depending 
on how much and how positively an environment reacts to human intervention this will 
lead in turn to changes in the environment, the reference group and the self-perception 
in self-enforcing feedback loops. 
Research has shown that people with higher self-efficacy are more persistent, have a 
lower incidence of angst and depression, and are more successful in their education and 
training. Locke and Latham (1990) found what they called a “high performance cycle” in 
that people with higher self-efficacy tend to have higher expectations, which lead to 
setting higher goals. In a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, they will then put in more effort 
to reach their higher goals which, when accomplished, increases their sense of self-
efficacy more. 
Our research identifies historical environmentally shaped, and subsequently bequest 
self-efficacy as the source of entrepreneurial traits. Since the time of Schumpeter (1934) 
until today Galor and Michalopoulos (2012), entrepreneurial behavior has been linked 
to economic development. Entrepreneurship is usually described by its symptoms: 
openness to novelty, explorative, longer planning horizons, greater risk taking, faster in 
5 
 
innovation adaptation and others. But what causes and enables a person to be and act 
more or less entrepreneurial?  
Self-efficacy is generally defined as the belief to be able to reach specific goals; here, this 
goal will be to better one´s livelihood by increasing household income while the belief 
concentrates on the ability, not the goal; self-efficacy is process-oriented, not goal-
oriented. We research how different environments gave different signals to their 
inhabitants, either rewarding or discouraging entrepreneurial behavior, thereby shaping 
their culture which affects today’s income distribution.  
If the environment does not request or reward human intervention, self-efficacy cannot 
develop; well–adapted behavior in this case could foster entitlement or resilience as 
survival strategies, but not self-efficacy. They can occur simultaneously but are 
independent, their asymmetric occurrence offering ample cause for societal problems. 
Think of nomadic groups surviving an inhospitable, barren environment only by regular 
raiding, without ever being able to develop a sense of self-efficacy as their life space does 
not react to intervention of their capacity like hard work, planning, investment. Or 
consider communities whose achievements are regularly destroyed by natural 
catastrophes or lives cut short by uncontrollable diseases like malaria. It is the 
experience of successful entrepreneurship, like choosing the right crop, employing the 
right amount of work and capital, doing the right kind of planning for storage, 
cooperation, and trade, that gives people a higher perception of their own ability to reach 
their goals, to influence their livelihood. In the following, we provide evidence for 
historically lower returns on agricultural investments having led to lower levels of self-
efficacy and incomes today.  
In the next section (II), we discuss the relationship between self-efficacy and economic 
development. Then, the development of a theoretical model and its simulation in an 
agent based modelling framework follow (section III). Our first empirical analysis is based 
on cross sectional data and presented in section IV, followed by our second empirical 
analysis using panel data in section V. We discuss our research in section VI and 
conclude in section VII. 
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II. Self-Efficacy and Economic Development 
The term self-efficacy here is defined as a person’s subjective belief in her ability to 
achieve a specific goal. This belief is context and task dependent as people have high/low 
self-efficacy in some situations and low/high self-efficacy in others. In this study, we are 
concerned with economic development, therefore using the term self-efficacy as a 
person´s belief to improve her livelihood. The set goal is to escape poverty by increasing 
her income. The role of self-efficacy is that depending on what people think they can 
achieve, they set differently ambitious goals, invest (in its broadest meaning, including 
effort, energy, time and money) differently into achieving these goals and for different 
stretches of time. 
Analyzing individuals and groups of people, psychologists have collected much evidence 
so far, that self-efficacy affects almost every area of human endeavor. The reason is that 
people set different goals for themselves, are differently motivated, and likely to persist 
and to succeed dependent on their belief of having the ability to achieve their goals. 
This mechanism has been found in the realm of developing creativity (Tierney & Farmer, 
2011), losing weight (McCarroll et al., 2014), avoiding risky sexual behavior (Bandura, 
1990), academic achievement (Bandura et al., 1996), and the performance of a modern 
agricultural value chain in West Africa (Wuepper & Sauer, 2015), to name just a few 
examples.  
Self-efficacy, or the lack thereof, contributes to a range of phenomena, such as problems 
of self-control (e.g. when tempted, individuals with low self-efficacy convince themselves 
that their effort is hopeless either way and thus consume their capital instead of 
saving/investing), high time preference (e.g. the feeling of helplessness makes 
individuals with low self-efficacy discount their future stronger), and possibly 
trustworthiness (if resignation allows individuals to justify bad behavior). Culture and 
institutions developed in a given environment are impacted by individual self-efficacy as 
it defines her stand in her life circumstance including her social group. Individuals with 
low self-efficacy and , a perception of entitlement living in and the environmental 
conditions apt for it, they will have great incentives for building exploitative institutions, 
to redistribute the natural resource endowment and gain some kind of power position, 
whereas individuals with high self-efficacy have a much greater incentive to build 
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inclusive institutions to safe on the social and material costs of power struggle and 
hampering development. 
The basic premise of this article is that if people use cultural rules of thumb to guide 
their decisions, it is important to know whether these rules of thumb are well adapted 
to the current context. The hypothesis is that this is not always given, and in the 
following sections, we try to answer the questions why and whether it really matters. 
Consider table 1, which shows four combinations of the current context and people´s 
self-efficacy. For much of human history, we know that people had limited abilities to 
achieve per capita income growth and we assume that they were aware of this (bottom, 
right). However, in some environments people subsequently learned how to improve their 
lives, so their ability was actually high and they were probably aware of this too (up, 
left). It is not clear what would happen to individuals with high self-efficacy but low 
actual efficacy (bottom, left). Research shows that in many contexts this configuration 
could be surprisingly successful and hence evolve, despite its mismatch between mental 
model and reality (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). The combination that is of most interest 
here is shown in the up-right corner. It is the opposite of the combination before and 
describes individuals who are foregoing chances because they do not perceive them as 
such. These people might use an obtained micro credit for consumption, drop out of 
profitable innovations or continue with an unprofitable business despite better 
alternatives.  
 
Table 1 here 
 
How could there be people who do not belief in their economic development potential 
even though they have huge incentives and no other binding constraint than their 
misconception of their context? 
One possible answer is that if the context of people changes enough, their inherited self-
efficacy might not fit their changed environment. Interesting examples come from studies 
of migrants (here, it is not really the context that changed but people moved to a new 
context). Nisbett and Cohen (1996), e.g. find that people in the South of the USA still 
carry their culture of honor, that helped their ancestors to defend their cattle in historic 
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Ireland, even though it is rather disadvantageous in their new environment. People 
whose ancestors were involved in farming instead of herding have an entirely different 
culture. Globally, Galor and Özak (2014) find that historic returns on agricultural 
investments explain the distribution of time preferences today./ 
In the study at hand, we argue that the historic return on agricultural investment 
shaped a more fundamental cultural trait, self-efficacy, which in turn is at the root of 
many cultural and institutional differences between individuals and societies and 
governs social relationships through the compensative effect of power: power 
compensates a lack of self-efficacy if the perception of entitlement is large enough to 
seek it. 
Theoretically, self-efficacy is clearly distinguished from self-confidence, locus of control, 
agency, and many related constructs; empirically, the distinction is less clear. In 
economics, related studies have focused on self-confidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002) and 
locus of control (Tabellini, 2010). Especially Tabellini (2010) is likely to actually measure 
self-efficacy or parts thereof with his proxy variable “locus of control". 
 
III. Theoretical Model and Simulation 
We develop an agent-based model that captures the evolution of self-efficacy in different 
subsistence populations. Individuals differ in their propensity to make productive 
investments depending on their level of self-efficacy, whereas their environment 
determines the return on such investments. Over time, people learn whether it is more 
profitable to rely on their natural resource endowments or rather try to improve upon 
them. Thus, we can assume that different environments were historically more or less 
profitable for investments with extremes marked by environments were underinvesting 
was deadly and environments were overinvesting was deadly. The knowledge which 
strategy works best is then passed on to the next generation culturally, while the 
genetically inherited inclination for more reward seeking activity as well as present day 
epigenetic triggers influence the general propensity for more or less activity. Some 
children would thus inherit information how to adapt to their environment while others 
would inherit information how to adapt their environment and both would inherit 
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different levels of employable reward seeking which we assume as evenly spread and 
therefore not weigh it individually.  
At the beginning of each generation, these two survival strategies compete in a weighted 
lottery. 
Formally, the first generation differs in its propensity to invest and this propensity is 
denoted with 𝛼𝑖𝑡, which reflect the individuals’ level of self-efficacy.  
Assume people live for two periods and they choose how much to invest in the first. 
Then, they will have two incomes 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡+1, which differ depending on their investment 
choice: 
(𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡+1) = {
(𝑅𝑡
𝐿, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 )    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  
(𝑅𝑡
𝐻 , 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻  )   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
            (1) 
Thus, higher self-efficacy and a higher (positive) average income difference between high 
and low investment, determine together the amount of investment and income. 
(𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡+1) = {
(𝑅𝑡
𝐿, 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐿 )    𝑖𝑓 𝛼𝑖𝑡 ≤ ?̂?(𝑅
𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿)  
(𝑅𝑡
𝐻 , 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐻  )   𝑖𝑓 𝛼𝑖𝑡  > ?̂?(𝑅
𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿) 
            (2) 
With 𝑅𝑡
𝐻 < 𝑅𝑡
𝐿 because of the higher investment. 
Note: There are environments, in which the people cannot improve their productivity 
(𝑅𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿 < 0. Think of hunter-gatherers in Egypt before irrigation was invented and 
before getting into contact with farmers from the fertile crescent; however, there are also 
environments in which people could improve their productivity (𝑅𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿 > 0) – but only 
if they believe in it. Think again about the hunter-gatherers in Egypt, but now directly 
after they have been brought into contact with irrigation and the idea of farming. Now, 
individuals have to decide whether and how much they want to invest into this new 
technology.  Finally, there are environments in which people must invest in order to 
survive: for example people who migrated to places with harsh winters. In these 
environments, lack of investments into shelter and storage facilities was likely a one-
time mistake. 
The number of children raised with high self-efficacy (𝑛𝐻𝑆𝐸  ) and the number of children 
raised with low self-efficacy (𝑛𝐿𝑆𝐸) depends on the relative return on investment for high 
(𝑅𝐻) and low (𝑅𝐿) investments and the culture of the parents (𝛼𝑖𝑡): 
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𝑛𝑖,𝑡+1 = {
 
 
𝑅𝐻 ≡ 𝑛𝐻𝑆𝐸  𝑖𝑓  𝛼𝑖𝑡 ≤ ?̂?(𝑅
𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿)
𝑅𝐿 ≡ 𝑛𝐿𝑆𝐸   𝑖𝑓 𝛼𝑖𝑡  > ?̂?(𝑅
𝐻 − 𝑅𝐿)
            (3) 
The question then is what happens if culture is not optimally adapted to the 
environment. This should be a common feature of culture, as it is mostly persistent and 
not constantly optimized, which means it can be “outdated” and there might be strong 
incentives for change. A possible simplification to the process of cultural change is to 
model it as a function of the stability of a cultural “equilibrium”. The incentives and 
constraints that determine the stability of the cultural equilibrium are not only 
externally given but mediated and affected by a society’s institutions, which reinforce 
the culture that shaped them. This might be expressed as follows: 
𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿1𝛼𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿2 𝐼𝑘𝑡(∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑡) + 𝛿3𝑍𝑖𝑡          (4) 
Where 𝛼𝑖𝑡 represents the culture of an individual, which depends on the culture of her 
parents 𝛼𝑗𝑡−1, as well as the current institutions 𝐼𝑘𝑡 of her society, which are in turn 
determined by the culture of the other members of society ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑡, and culture is impacted 
by a vector of context variables 𝑍𝑖𝑡 that are assumed independent from culture and 
institutions. The influences are weighted by 𝛿1, 𝛿2, and 𝛿3. Holding the first term constant 
across individuals, the ration between 𝛿2 and 𝛿3 determines whether institutions enforce 
the status quo culture or whether the context leads to cultural change. 
To explore these ideas, below the model is simulated in the agent-based modeling 
software Netlogo. 
The start is a population of subsistence farmers, of which some are naturally more 
entrepreneurial (high self-efficacy, blue) than others (low self-efficacy, red). Unpopulated 
land is shown in green. Depending on the context, high and low self-efficacy are 
differently fit (in a Darwinian sense), which determines the reproductive success of the 
two groups of farmers in time. The example in figure 1 shows an environment in which 
high self-efficacy is the better adapted to the environment and hence dominates low self-
efficacy after a while.  
 
Figure 1 here 
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Exogenous variables are investment costs, profit, risk-probability and risk-impact, as 
well as institutional persistence, which captures how fast institutions adapt to economic 
incentives. (The investment risk can take on negative values, which captures the idea 
that sometimes, not investing is the riskier alternative.) These variables determine the 
modeling outcome. 
Endogenously evolving variables are the relative fitness of the two survival strategies and 
thus the developing population shares of farmers with high and low self-efficacy. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
With a rather low return on investment in context A, low self-efficacy evolves. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
With a rather high return on investment in context B, high self-efficacy evolves. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Because in context C institutions are more persistent than in context B, cultural change 
is slow. 
The first testable hypothesis suggested by the model is that the descendants of 
individuals in high return on investment environments have a higher level of self-efficacy 
than the descendants of individuals in low return on investment environments (cultural 
evolution hypothesis). 
The second hypothesis is that individuals with higher self-efficacy now generally 
generate higher incomes because technological change has turned most environments 
into high return on investment contexts (income hypothesis). 
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The third hypothesis suggested by the model is that individuals with higher self-efficacy 
would generate higher incomes because they invest more (effort, work, 
capital)(investment hypothesis). 
The fourth hypothesis is that individuals also generate higher incomes because they 
persist longer in the face of adversity (persistence hypothesis). Please note that 
persistence is a part of self-efficacy, it is the ability to try harder for a longer time span. 
It should not be mistaken for resilience which is an independent trait: resilience is the 
ability to withstand severe drawbacks, and spring back after having suffered through 
external shocks. Resilience may independently accompany self-efficacy, but may also, 
however, occur without self-efficacy in the form of endurance. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
The data for the following analysis was collected in a household survey in six different 
districts of the Central, Eastern and Greater Accra regions of Southern Ghana amongst 
smallholder pineapple farmers in 2013. For export-certified farmers, the sampling was 
based on the strategy of Kleemann and Abdulai (2013), who used stratified random 
sampling with the support of development agencies and the Pineapple Exporters 
Association of Ghana in 2011. Starting out with the main pineapple growing districts in 
Ghana, they randomly selected groups of certified farmers from lists of all certified 
farming groups to then randomly select a farm group-proportional number of farmers 
for the survey. 
For this study, roughly 200 of the farmers were surveyed again in 2013 and about 200 
non-certified farmers were interviewed for the first time. For the non-certified farmers 
there were no lists available. Thus, development agencies and extension agents were 
asked to identify representative groups of non-certified farmers, of whom 200 farmers 
were surveyed. It is acknowledged that this sampling strategy is not fully random. While 
the certified farmers were determined by stratified random sampling, the non-certified 
farmers were chosen by their adjacency to the sampled certified farmers. The crucial 
assumption here is that by using a representative sample of certified farmers and by 
sampling non-certified farmers who live nearby, the whole sample is representative. This 
seems plausible as the certification process is determined highly idiosyncratic and does 
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not show any pattern that would suggest that non-certified farmers close to our sampled 
communities to be significantly different from non-certified farmers further away.  
Table 2 shows the variables that will be used in the empirical analysis. Most importantly, 
several rather similar questions were asked, all aiming at how much the farmers believe 
to have the ability and capability to improve their farm income. As it turns out it, slight 
differences in these questions matter a great deal. The variable “nature” captures 
whether the farmers have the feeling that nature provides for them or whether they feel 
it is their own task to make nature productive. Many farmers reported that in their 
region, it is not necessary to use fertilizer or to invest into the fields, as the soil is very 
rich and pineapples grow well without additional investments. It was interesting to note 
how often many of these farmers used the word “providing” also during small talk, which 
might hint at a distinct more passive world view. Alternatively, the farmers were also 
asked with an “open-end goal” about the first two factors influencing their income that 
came to their mind. The large variety of answers ranged from not drinking alcohol to  
“hard work”, “bad weather” and “improved production technology”. We rated internal 
factors with a score of 3 (“improved”, “learned”, “changed”, etcetera), ambiguous answers 
with a 2 (including “hard work” as it is not clear whether this is understood as mere 
surviving or working towards an improvement) and external answers with a 1 (“weather”, 
“prices”, “costs”, etcetera). Yet another question provided the variable “ability” - whether 
the farmer believes that his current income has been more influenced by his own 
decisions and abilities or rather not - which is close to the open ended question, with 
the difference that perhaps it is more suggestive what the question aims at.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The question “control” - whether the farmer feels to make his life or that life happens to 
him - sought to identify resignation, rather aiming at the lower end of the spectrum from 
perceived helplessness to strongly developed self-efficacy. In contrast, “responsibility” - 
whether the farmer feels responsible for the success of his farm or whether the success 
is mostly determined by factors he cannot influence - has a stronger normative and 
suggestive focus than the other questions. The question on “work” - whether the basis 
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of economic success is hard work and creativity or rather connections and/or luck - 
aims at a general perception rather than a specific attitude. 
The variable “planning” is somewhat distinct from the others but also captures an aspect 
of self-efficacy, as one would expect a person with greater self-efficacy to discount her 
future less and plan for longer time stretches. 
The main dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the income from pineapples 
(which is the main source of cash-income, often indeed the only one). To control for 
potential confounders a set of control variables is always included, with the bio-
geography of the farmer, his market context and the relationship to the local chief, 
amongst them. We do not want to control for production technology, pineapple variety, 
input use, credits and similar variables, which are plausibly results of culture (“bad 
controls” in the words of Angrist and Pischke (2008)). In fact, after the investigation of 
whether historic production systems predict self-efficacy levels and whether this 
explains income differences, control for the per area harvest of the farmers allows us to 
probe whether this could be the channel through which self-efficacy increases income. 
If our hypothesis is correct - that self-efficacy leads the farmers to invest more work, 
effort and inputs into their fields – and conditional to controlling for soils, rainfall and 
prices, per area harvest should explain a good share of the pineapple income and if it is 
the main or sole channel through which self-efficacy affects income, the per area harvest 
should completely take away the significance from self-efficacy.  
Table 3 ranks the farmers into three income groups and shows their descriptive 
statistics. The income ranking is reflected in the variables “nature”, “income factor”, 
“planning”, “responsibility”, “work” and the principal components of “income factor”, 
planning” and “nature”, which is supposed to erase measurement errors and capture 
the underlying concept of self-efficacy. For the variables “control” and “ability”, the 
ranking does not show. As the current context is more beneficial of farmers with a higher 
income (less malaria, more rain and larger farms), we need to control for omitted 
variables and reverse causality: the cultural variables could erroneously capture more 
self-efficacy because of a more business conducive context – not historically but 
currently. 
 
Table 3 here 
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Prior to our main analysis, we have to test the variable “income factor”, which is 
constructed from whether the stated income factors of the farmers aim at internal or 
external determinants. By definition, this variable only captures the subjective self-
efficacy of a farmer if it is sufficiently independent from her objective context. Thus, we 
have to test whether the farmers who describe their income to be altered by learning or 
the adoption of an innovation, received more training from development organizations in 
the past; in this case, they would have received more external help and their reported 
income factor would not necessarily reflect their distinct world view. Specification (1) in 
table 4 actually shows the opposite. Farmers who state a more internal income factor 
received less training in the past, not more. Similarly, asking whether farmers who 
describe their income to be more externally determined (e.g. weather or prices) actually 
live in more difficult environments; specification (2) establishes that non-farm income is 
not significant and both specifications (1) and (2) show that prices are insignificant too, 
while rainfall quantity is interestingly negative and not positive, and only rainfall 
variability has the expected negative sign while also being significant. As last piece of 
evidence, current variables only explain 21 - 25% of the variation in the income factor 
variable, leaving much unexplained variation to our hypothesized historic channel. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
To establish baseline empirical relationships, table 5 presents the results of OLS 
estimations, always controlling for the same list of control variables (biogeography, 
prices, local chiefs, farm size), but with alternating measures of self-efficacy. Except for 
the variable “work”, all measures of self-efficacy are significantly and positively 
correlated with the logarithm of the annual farm income. In line with the expectation 
that we measure self-efficacy with a large error, specification (5) which uses the extracted 
principal components of three different measures, has the highest explanatory power. It 
should be noted that we omit some of the most obvious explanatory variables, because 
any variables related to investment are the main hypothesized intermediate effect of self-
efficacy and would hence bias our self-efficacy variable. 
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Table 5 here 
 
Having seen the robust empirical relationship between self-efficacy and income, we can 
now turn to the question of whether this relationship is a causal one, from self-efficacy 
to income. 
Our agent-based model is built on the idea that historic returns on investment 
determined the evolution of self-efficacy. When the Portuguese introduced maize in 
Ghana in the 16th century, the regions that were most suitable to its cultivation saw a 
large increase in their return on investment. Thus, based on FAO’s GAEZ-database, we 
used information on the regional suitability for rain-fed maize production in Ghana and 
created a dummy variable indicating the areas in Ghana where maize had a comparative 
advantage over other crops. We assume that a historic advantage in maize production is 
unlikely to affect the current income of pineapple farmers other than through the self-
efficacy channel as suggested by the agent-based model. This assumption might seem 
strong at first sight. Even though we control for the current pineapple suitability of the 
farms, and hence for any potential correlation between historic maize advantage and 
current pineapple suitability, there are still more or less plausible channels which could 
invalidate our exclusion restriction. First of all, what if the advantage in maize translated 
into higher incomes and regional development? Or perhaps the advantage in maize 
correlated with advantages in other crops than maize or pineapple that somehow affected 
incomes and/or culture? And finally, how well do we actually identify self-efficacy? It is 
quite possible that such a fundamental characteristic as regional crop suitability affected 
a whole range of cultural traits, e.g. social capital or time preferences.  
 
Table 6 here 
 
We sort these concerns into two groups: The “income concern” and the “other trait 
concern”. 
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Table 6 shows that the advantage in maize does neither predict social capital (F value of 
the excluded instrument is 2.3) nor non-farm income (F value of the excluded instrument 
is 0.2 and 0.7). We can assume that economically better-off regions would offer more 
non-farm income possibilities, as a lack thereof is a common development indicator in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Especially, non-farm income might be an indicator for market 
distance, as places that offer non-farm income might also be places where pineapples 
can be sold at higher quantities or prices. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
The finding that the historical advantage for maize production does not predict social 
capital is reassuring, as this suggests that our instrument affects an individual cultural 
trait. Of course, there are still several cultural traits that are individual but as shown in 
table 7, from the tested measures of culture, it is the aspects that are closest to our 
definition of self-efficacy that are significant, while related but slightly differently 
nuanced aspects are insignificant. This should make us confident that self-efficacy is 
identified and not a different cultural trait.  
The first specification in table 7 shows whether the farmer believes that her current 
income has been mostly determined by her decisions and abilities is neither clearly 
predicted by our instrument nor does it significantly affect the farmer’s income. The 
same is true for whether the farmer feels that she is responsible for her current income 
(specification 7) or whether she believes hard work and creativity to be the cause of 
economic success (specification 8).  
In contrast, table 7 shows that farmers have higher incomes if they name income 
determinants that they can control (in contrast to income determinants that they 
cannot control), if they have longer planning horizons, and if they believe it is their 
task to make nature more productive. Recall that with table 4, it is established that 
farmers who name external or internal income determinants do not describe objectively 
different context but simply interpret them differently. 
Except for the planning horizon, we are concerned about the strength of our 
instrument, being careful with interpreting the estimated coefficients. However, using 
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the principal components of our significant self-efficacy measures, we are able to avoid 
measurement errors (specification 5) to a large extent, which shows in a sufficiently 
strong F-statistic for the excluded instrument and a higher R² in the second stage.   
Reassuringly, the principal components, which can be seen as our best approximation 
to farmers’ self-efficacy, explain significantly more income than the farmers´ planning 
horizon, which up to this point could still have been a plausible alternative (instead of 
seeing the planning horizon as a byproduct of self-efficacy, the alternative channel 
could have been that the advantage in maize increased the farmers’ patience, which 
increased their income via persistence, which in turn increased their self-efficacy). 
Thus, we conclude that we cannot reject our first two hypotheses, that higher 
historical returns on investment selected a higher cultural equilibrium of self-efficacy 
than lower historical returns on investment and that this cultural distinction is 
reflected in different income levels.  
Figure 5 graphically displays how the world-view of many farmers differs from what we 
would observe under instantaneous cultural adaptation. Consider farmers A and B. They 
both live in a mildly adverse environment with suboptimal rainfall, low prices, etc. 
However, farmer A believes to have the ability to achieve a higher income and is hence 
highly motivated to find solutions to obstacles in his way (which we find above is a self-
fulfilling prophecy). Farmer B on the other hand, lives in the same environment but does 
not feel to have the ability to achieve a higher income and is hence less likely to put 
much effort into his job or keep his attempts up for a long period of time (which would 
reassure him in his view of not being fully in control, which again, is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy). The same difference can also be seen in a more beneficial environment. 
Farmers C and D share a similarly enabling environment but interpret it differently, just 
as the farmers A and B do.  
 
Figure 5 here 
 
The third hypothesis that would corroborate the first and the underlying model, is that 
invested effort, work and capital are the causal channel through which self-efficacy 
increases incomes. Given our data, we cannot observe the investment of the farmers and 
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asking about them does not seem sufficiently reliable. However, we can observe a proxy; 
that is, conditional to controlling for soil and rain, as well as the pineapple price, the 
per-area harvest should reliably reflect how much the farmers invest. As shown in table 
8, the variables found to best capture self-efficacy in table 6 all become insignificant 
when we control for the per area harvest, which is robustly significant in all 
specifications. Furthermore, the suggested effect of the per-area harvest is about four 
times as large as the effect of price, which could possibly be an underestimation, if the 
price reflects a better quality achieved by farmers who invest more. 
In conclusion, we also cannot reject our third hypothesis that the entire effect of higher 
self-efficacy runs through higher investments of various kinds.  
 
Table 8 here 
 
To summarize this section, we find that historical environments shaped the regionally 
distinct evolution of self-efficacy, which makes farmers try differently hard to increase 
their income, which in turn explains a significant share of their actual income. 
 
V. Further Tests of the Causal Channel 
The fourth and final hypothesis is that farmers with high self-efficacy are more 
persistent. For this last hypothesis we use a second dataset from Ghana. As mentioned 
in the beginning, the export-certified pineapple farmers of our survey have been 
surveyed in 2010 by Kleemann and Abdulai (2013). Thus, for these farmers, we can 
combine the 2013 dataset with the 2010 dataset to create a (smaller) panel data set of 
173 farmers in two periods. The sampling procesure of Kleeman and Abdulai (2013) 
was stratified randomized sampling, representative for export certified pineapple 
farmers in Ghana, whereas the cross sectional dataset used above is representative for 
the whole population of Ghanaian pineapple farmers. All of these farmers are however 
smallholders, living in the same communities. 
Using panel data, we can observe (at least short-term) adoption and dis-
adoption dynamics of agricultural innovations. We consider chemical fertilizer, agro-
ecological practices (AEP) and mulching, all of which have been found profitable for the 
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farmers but at the same time dynamically adopted and dis-adopted at rather low 
levels. Table 9 establishes basic observations for farmers with different levels of self-
efficacy. It can be seen that fertilizer is generally most diffused already, followed by 
mulching, followed by AEPs. For fertilizer, the relationship with self-efficacy does not 
seem to be strong. In contrast, for AEP and mulching, there could be a meaningful 
relationship. Regarding the question whether we can observe farmers with higher self-
efficacy to be more resilient, table 9 shows that farmers with high self-efficacy seem 
unlikely to dis-adopt fertilizer and mulching, and farmers with low self-efficacy seem 
likely to dis-adopt AEPs. Whether this is actually true is shown in table 10. 
 
Table 9 here 
 
Table 10 shows that farmers with higher self-efficacy are less likely to dis-adopt 
mulching or fertilizer. The coefficient for the dis-adoption of AEPs has the expected sign 
but is not significant, which might be because of the low initial diffusion of AEPs. The 
adoption of AEPs and mulching is significantly affected by self-efficacy. The coefficient 
for the adoption of fertilizer has the expected sign but is not significant, which might be 
because of the wide diffusion of fertilizer. 
 
Table 10 here 
 
In summary, the panel data shows that self-efficacy is important to start the diffusion 
of innovations and to avoid dis-adoption of once adopted innovations. This is 
consistent with our fourth hypothesis that self-efficacy makes farmers more likely to 
keep their investments up, even when they are tempted to dis-invest.  
 
VI. Discussion 
How can we know that it is self-efficacy that we are finding and how can we distinguish 
it from related concepts? And is it simply genetically inherited?  
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Compare self-efficacy to the big-bang and its causing today´s cosmic background 
radiation: we cannot measure it directly but we can measure its short- and long-term 
effects. We asked a range of questions that reveal related but not identical constructs. 
According to our theoretical considerations, it is self-efficacy that has a significant effect 
on the economic success of individuals, because it increases motivation to act by 
increasing belief in the abiltity to act appropiately. Consistent with this expectation, we 
find that questions that measure self-efficacy have the suggested, significant effect on 
economic outcomes via changing people’s investment behavior, whereas questions that 
measure related but different concepts here are insignificant. 
The revealing pattern we detect is that process-oriented questions identify self-efficacy, 
whereas result-oriented questions do not. 
Questions on 
 whether nature provides what the farmer needs or whether it is the task of the 
farmer to make nature productive; 
 the most important income determinants, i.e. whether external factors were 
named (e.g. weather), or internal factors (e.g. learning, while controlling for 
peoples’ observable environment (weather, training, market prices, etcetera); 
 how far ahead the farmer plans (from a day to the life of his children);  
as well as the principal components of the above three (to reduce the measurement error) 
measure self-efficacy, as we define it, well. Important is the individual believe to be able 
to do what is necessary to reach a certain goal, which is interestingly not much related 
to peoples’ external context. The weight here lies on the process about which the 
individual feels confident.. A person with self-efficacy believes that whatever goal she 
sets herself or has set for her she will be able to tackle. The goal as such is not the 
important thing, important are her abilities and her believe in them. When problems 
arise on the way, she is likely not to give up easily as she is able to adjust to changes 
and may well adjust the goal itself, which is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
Simple rephrasing can shift the focus from the process to the result. We found that 
questions only slightly differently worded did not find self-efficacy.  
Asking 
 whether the farmer´s current income had been mostly determined by his 
decisions and abilities or rather not; 
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 whether the farmer felt to “make his life” or whether “life happens to him”; 
 whether the farmer feels responsible for the success of his farm or whether the 
success was mostly determined by factors he could not influence; 
 whether the basis of economic success is hard work and creativity or rather 
connections and/or luck 
do not measure self-efficacy. Possibly hidden in the answers could be information on 
agency and locus of control. The concept of agency does indeed carry the responsibility 
not for the process but for the result, it identifies the person who takes on the 
responsibility for reaching a certain task and thereby carries a moral aspect as much as 
the danger of burdening the agent. Locus of control refers to a person´s notion of being 
the one who makes the decisions, to be indeed the one who is in control of his own 
matters. Further research must be aware and careful about what aspect of the economic 
process the wording of a question is aiming at as much as the suggestive identity of the 
one asking.  
Some scientists have linked entrepreneurial behavior to novelty seeking which was then 
thought to be genetically conditioned and inherited (Galor and Michalopoulos (2012); on 
genetic inheritance of self-efficacy, Waaktaar and Torgersen (2013) on genetics versus 
environment). It was assumed that a certain genetic polymorphism was correlated to 
novelty seeking (Benjamin et al., 1996; Ebstein et al., 1996). Extensive research could 
not verify this (Faraone, Doyle, Mick, & Biederman, 2014; Munafò, Yalcin, Willis-Owen, 
& Flint, 2008; Wu, Xiao, Sun, Zou, & Zhu, 2012), the link between novelty seeking and 
genes was found to have been a mislead interpretation and would have carried the 
danger of falsly regarding it as historic and genetic heritage, unchangeable by policy 
measures. Entrepreneurship is in any case much more than novelty seeking. Though it 
does take interest and openness for novelty to be a successful entrepreneur, it also takes 
less adventurous, but pragmatic and complex qualities like planning, high frustration 
tolerance, hard work, learning, cooperation, decision making.  
Complex human behavior like entrepreneurial can be assumed to be the result of 
interaction and feedback loops of genetic disposition, epigenetic triggers, education and 
example, and personal and environmental circumstance (Chakraborty, Thompson, & 
Yehoue, 2015). Merely the disposition for a brain´s reactiveness to certain stimuli in its 
complex electro-chemical interaction can be discovered in the genes. If and how this 
translates into actual behavior depends on the opportunities, rewards and restrictions 
23 
 
of personal life conditions, natural surrounding and on the culture and institutions 
adaptively developed by its inhabitants. If an environment neither requests nor rewards 
a certain behavior it will usually not persist or spread (except of those odd cases where 
a special feature developed as useful in certain conditions and was not given up as 
useless after these conditions changed when it was not harmful). Regularly, only what 
is needed and pays off the effort in will be repeated in acts of individual and collective 
learning, and respective genetic changes passed on and spread if the gained advantage 
is also one in reproduction. Phenomena like the absence of wide-spread entrepreneurial 
traits within the ranks of 19th century nobility as suggested by Galor and Michalopoulos 
(2012) could for example not be explained except by environmental triggers: especially 
the existence of wealth inheritance and status-quo conservative culture made 
entrepreneurial behavior neither necessary nor desirable, and left the system of rewards 
for hard, risky and environmentally adapted entrepreneurial work to those who needed 
it.  
The genetic correlation we believe to have found was one of merely better reproductive 
success of those who developed greater levels of self-efficacy through better livelihood 
(cmp. Chakraborty et al. (2015)). And this effect works two-fold: People with higher self-
efficacy will be more affluent and thereby healthier, and be more attractive as 
reproductive partners. Their better livelihood can be expected to raise more and healthier 
off-spring. This genetic effect of increased reproduction of people with higher self-efficacy 
causes more children to grow up under more promoting conditions with individual and 
possibly collective cultural learning in a community of adults with greater self-efficacy. 
Children learn from their parents to form their self-images not only by conscious 
association through speech, education, stories, but also unconsciously and thereby 
highly resistant to change as a meme (Kandel, 2007). As parenting has been found to 
have a significant influence (Bandura, 1993; Whitbeck et al., 1997) another line of 
genetic influence via greater self-efficacy suggests a positive influence on the 
development of entrepreneurial traits: parents tend to actively teach their children to 
follow their survival strategies and pass on especially their entrepreneurial knowledge 
which tends to accumulate over the generations (Chakraborty et al., 2015). The sense of 
entitlement passed by generations of professionals of any trade as well as a higher level 
of resilience of generations that were able to cope in their environment, altogether the 
traits of an empowered person well-prepared for successful economic behavior, can be 
expected to be culturally bequest but biologically made possible through family bonds.. 
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VII. Conclusion 
Our research suggests that self-efficacy forms the core of entrepreneurial human 
behavior by enabling an individual to believe in her abilities to set the right goals and to 
reach them. This belief being distinctly different from formerly discussed concepts of 
self-confidence, locus of control or agency positively influences people´s risk taking, time 
preferences with planning horizons and discounting, and openness to innovations. We 
developed a theoretical model showing how self-efficacy develops in an ongoing process 
at all times and everywhere. It is culturally bequest via individual and collective learning 
and fostered through genetic and epigenetic reproductive advantages of better 
adaptation to environmental stimuli. We test the model on self-efficacy with 2013 cross 
sectional data and 2009-2013 panel data from smallholder farmers in Ghana and find 
that farmers with greater levels of self-efficacy have higher incomes today than those 
with lesser levels of self-efficacy and that they show a higher innovation adoption 
dynamic. This suggests that development policy measures should target to increase self-
efficacy of farmers.. Present developmental policy measures like microcredits, providing 
infrastructure, or training would greatly profit in their effectiveness as they are presently 
tailored only for people who are ready to make use of the opportunities offered, but leave 
out those who would need support in building the self-efficacy to be able to do so. 
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Table 1: Taxonomy of Self-Efficacy 
 Self-Efficacy High Self-Efficacy Low 
Actual Efficacy High Development Unused Opportunities 
Actual Efficacy Low Ambiguous Stagnation in Poverty 
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Figure 1. The Evolution of Self-Efficacy (blue) in a population of differently 
entrepreneurial farmers 
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Figure 2. The Evolution of Self-Efficacy (Context A) 
 
Cost=0.3 Benefit=0.4 Risk probability=0.1 Risk impact=0.5 Institutional persistence=0.5 
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Figure 3. The Evolution of Self-Efficacy (Context B) 
 
Cost=0.44 Benefit=0.66 Risk probability=0.2 Risk impact=0.4 Institutional persistence=0.2 
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Figure 4. The Evolution of Self-Efficacy (Context C) 
 
Cost=0.44 Benefit=0.66 Risk probability=0.2 Risk impact=0.4 Institutional persistence=0.8 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
nature Whether nature provides what the farmer needs or whether it is the 
task of the farmer to make nature productive (1-4). 
income factor Open question about the most important income determinants. The 
answers were coded as one when a purely external factor was named 
(weather), three for purely internal factors (learning), and two for 
answers in between. 
planning How far ahead the farmer plans (from a day to the life of his children). 
ability Whether his current income has been mostly determined by his 
decisions and abilities or rather not. 
control Whether the farmer feels to “make his life” or whether “life happens to 
him”. 
responsibility Whether the farmer feels responsible for the success of his farm or 
whether the success is mostly determined by factors he cannot 
influence. 
work Whether the basis of economic success is hard work and creativity or 
rather connections and/or luck. 
pc_culture Principal components of income factor, planning and nature. 
non-farm inc A Whether the farmer has non-farm income. 
non-farm inc B How much non-farm income the farmer has. 
harvest Natural logarithm of the annual per hectare harvest of the farmer. 
adv. maize Whether the region of the farmer had a comparative advantage in 
producing maize. 
topography Standard deviation of the regional elevation. 
rain var Inter annual change in rainfall. 
soils The farmers rated how much their soils limited production from one 
to six. 
chief The farmers rated how open their chief is for new ideas from one to 
four. 
malaria Malaria ecology index, capturing the Malaria risk of different regions. 
farm size Size of the farms in hectares. 
price Regional price for pineapples. 
rain zone General rainfall zone (1-4). 
rain q Reported quantity of rain on the farm from one to six. 
rain t Reported timing of rain on the farm from one to six. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
income_class low medium high 
 mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev. 
nature 1.78 (1.07) 2.18 (1.33) 2.77 (1.37) 
income factor 1.81 (.76) 1.95 (.81) 2.29 (.75) 
planning 2.63 (1.63) 3.40 (1.81) 4.13 (1.93) 
ability 3.55 (.88) 3.54 (.95) 3.83 (.56) 
control 3.55 (.90) 3.49 (.98) 3.80 (.60) 
responsibility 3.70 (.64) 3.77 (.61) 3.82 (.57) 
work 3.77 (.52) 3.84 (.42) 3.86 (.48) 
non-farm inc A .18 (.39) .19 (.39) .34 (.47) 
non-farm inc B .15 (.09) .14 (.098) .17 (.11) 
pc culture -.20 (.63) .06 (.75) .51 (.80) 
adv. Cereals .23 (.10) .31 (.10) .31 (.08) 
Adv. cocoa .10 (.10) .10 (.09) .10 (.10) 
rain var .18 (1.30) -.19 (.41) -.22 (.31) 
soils 1.67 (.74) 1.65 (.82) 1.56 (.82) 
chief 5.02 (1.32) 5.44 (.88) 5.59 (1.00) 
malaria .05 (.94) -.47 (.84) -.28 (1.00) 
farmsize 2.70 (2.50) 2.89 (2.78) 4.52 (4.93) 
price .40 (.11) .39 (.09) .39 (.09) 
rain zone 2.30 (.83) 2.42 (.82) 2.49 (.68) 
rain q 4.42 (1.43) 4.48 (1.24) 4.64 (1.05) 
rain t 3.93 (1.53) 3.98 (1.46) 4.46 (1.22) 
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Table 4. Income Factor Falsification Test 
 (1) (2)    
 Income factor Income factor 
training -0.252***  
 (0.0729)  
non-farm A  0.0485    
  (0.0577)    
rain var -0.150** -0.150**  
 (0.0671) (0.0697)    
prices -0.0665 -0.0648  
 (0.0568) (0.0586)  
rain zone 0.274 0.324    
 (0.204) (0.210)    
rain q -0.241*** -0.266*** 
 (0.0782) (0.0819)    
rain t 0.0889 0.142    
 (0.0765) (0.0895)    
N 398 398    
R-sq 0.25 0.21 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by farm groups * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5. OLS Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)    (8) 
 income income income income income income income income 
ability 0.140**        
 (0.057)        
nature  0.243***       
  (0.0724)       
inc factor   0.201**       
   (0.0804)      
planning    0.220**      
    (0.0881)      
pc_culture     0.303***    
     (0.0868)     
control      0.184***   
      (0.0539)   
responsibility       0.0532*  
       (0.0314)  
work        0.00434    
        (0.0522)    
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
district fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 398 398 398 398 398    398 398 398  
R-sq 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.25  0.21 0.19 0.19  
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by farm groups * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6. Falsification Test 
 (1) (2) (3)    
2nd stage ln income ln income ln income 
social capital -0.964   
 (0.971)   
non-farm A  5.594  
  (12.02)  
non-farm B   2.457 
   (3.599) 
1st stage social capital nonfarm A nonfarm B 
adv maize -0.314 0.0541 0.123 
 (0.207) (0.116) (0.150) 
controls yes yes yes 
district fe yes yes yes 
N 398 398 398 
R-sq 2nd stage    
R-sq 1st stage 0.28 0.12 0.11 
F excluded   2.30 0.22 0.67 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by farm groups * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7. Instrumental Variables Estimation 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by farm groups * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
2nd stage income income income income income income income income 
ability 0.454        
 (0.285)        
nature  0.569**       
  (0.249)       
inc factor   0.661**      
   (0.313)      
planning    0.536**     
    (0.246)     
pc_culture     0.367**    
     (0.162)    
control      0.459   
      (0.289)   
responsibility       3.668  
       (9.566)  
work        -3.564 
        (10.22) 
1st stage ability nature inc fact planning pc_culture control Respons. work 
adv maize 0.667** 0.532** 0.458** 0.565*** 0.824*** 0.659** 0.0825 -
0.0849    
 (0.284) (0.212) (0.204) (0.167) (0.233) (0.310) (0.233) (0.233)    
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
district fe yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398    
R-sq 2nd 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.15   
R-sq 1st 0.21 0.29 0.23 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.11 0.10 
F excluded  5.51  6.32 5.03 11.37 12.49 4.53 0.13  0.13 
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Figure 5. The Current Context and the Level of Self-Efficacy 
 
Notes: the current context prediction is based on the control variables included in all 
specifications. These include weather, soils, prices, farm-size and malaria pressure. Self-
efficacy is the variable pc_culture, which are the principal components of “nature”, 
“income factor” and “planning”. 
 
40 
 
Table 8: Causal Channel 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2nd stage income income income income 
harvest 0.405** 0.398** 0.411*** 0.412*** 
 (0.169) (0.199) (0.145) (0.139) 
prices 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0424) (0.032) (0.0329) 
nature 0.101    
 (0.474)    
income 
factor 
 0.123   
  (0.584)   
planning   0.084  
   (0.406)  
pc_culture    0.0589 
    (0.283) 
1st stage nature inc fact. plannin
g 
pc_cult. 
adv maize 0.315* 0.257 0.377*** 0.539*** 
 (0.169) (0.188) (0.124) (0.166) 
controls yes yes yes yes 
district fe yes yes yes yes 
N 398 398 398 398 
R-sq 2nd 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
R-sq 1st 0.35 0.28 0.40 0.46 
F excluded  3.48  1.87 9.28  10.53  
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by farm groups * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Adoption and Dis-adoption of Innovations 
Self-efficacy low ambiguous high 
 mean sd mean sd mean sd 
adoption fertilizer .576 (.495) .767 (.427) .614 (.488) 
Dis-adoption 
fertilizer 
.110 (.314) .139 (.350) .014 (.119) 
adoption AEP .079 (.271) .162 (.373) .192 (.395) 
Dis-adoption AEP .233 (.424) .093 (.293) .114 (.319) 
adoption mulching .337 (.474) .372 (.489) .514 (.501) 
Dis-adoption 
mulching 
.220 (.416) .372 (.489) .014 (.119) 
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Table 10. Probit Results Adoption and Dis-Adoption Dynamics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 adoption 
fertilizer 
Dis-
adoption 
fertilizer 
adoption 
AEP 
Dis-
adoption 
AEP 
adoption 
mulching 
Dis-
adoption 
mulching 
Self-efficacy 0.0159 -0.495*** 0.265*** -0.155 0.223*** -0.648*** 
 (0.0928) (0.123) (0.0895) (0.142) (0.0852) (0.170)    
Controls Yes Yes yes Yes yes Yes 
Regional FE yes Yes Yes yes Yes yes 
N 346 346 346 346 346 346 
pseudo R-sq 0.12 0.20 0.06 0.37 0.12 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by farm groups * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
